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BARRED FROM PRACTICE? UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS AND BAR ADMISSIONS
INTRODUCTION
Jose Godinez-Samperio and his parents entered the United States
from Mexico on tourist visas when he was nine years old.1  They over-
stayed their visas, and his father—formerly a doctor in Mexico—
found work milking cows on a dairy farm while his mother—formerly
a dentist in Mexico—worked at a factory making sliding glass doors.2
Jose, who is now twenty-six years old, has successfully graduated from
high school,3 college, and Florida State University College of Law.4
Jose’s status as an undocumented immigrant is not unusual,5 but his
application to the Florida Bar is.6  Jose passed the exam portion of the
bar, and the Florida Board of Bar Examiners found that nothing in his
background disqualified him with respect to the moral character and
fitness test.7  Even in light of Jose’s impressive achievements, it is diffi-
cult to ignore the fact that he resides in the country illegally, an issue
that prompted the Board of Bar Examiners to submit his case to the
Florida Supreme Court for an advisory opinion.8  The Florida Su-
preme Court held after two years of consideration that undocumented
1. Miranda Leitsinger, Florida Bar: Illegal Alien Meets Moral Fitness Test, NBC NEWS (Aug.
9, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/09/13201048-florida-bar-illegal-immigrant-
meets-moral-fitness-test?lite; see also Undocumented Immigrant Can Be Lawyer, Florida Bar
Says, FOX NEWS LATINO (Aug. 8, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/08/08/un-
documented-immigrant-not-disqualified-from-florida-bar [hereinafter Undocumented
Immigrant].
2. Undocumented Immigrant, supra note 1.
3. Impressively, Jose graduated high school in 2004 as valedictorian.  Douglas Stanglin, Can
an Undocumented Immigrant Be Admitted to the Florida Bar?, USA TODAY (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2012/04/can-an-undocumented-immi-
grant-be-admitted-to-florida-bar/1#.UHeYQY4csqY.
4. Undocumented Immigrant, supra note 1.
5. The Pew Research Center estimated that 11.7 million unauthorized immigrants resided in
the United States in 2012.  Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Population Decline of Unauthorized Immi-
grants Stalls, May Have Reversed, PEW RES. CENTER (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.pewhispanic.
org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-reversed/.
6. See Undocumented Immigrant, supra note 1.
7. Leitsinger, supra note 1.
8. See Stanglin, supra note 3.  Stanglin also notes that many people view the issue of Jose’s
illegal status with some degree of hostility.  For example, political groups that oppose amnesty
for undocumented immigrants view Jose’s choice to remain in the United States after he turned
eighteen as evidence of contempt for American law, and argue that this should prevent him from
ever practicing law. See id.
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individuals cannot be admitted to the state bar absent legislation spe-
cifically allowing their admission.9  Similar cases have arisen in Cali-
fornia and New York.10
Immigration reform has become one of the biggest issues con-
fronting Congress, and there is no disputing that United States immi-
gration policy is in dire need of reform.11  Jose’s situation is one
example of the complications that can arise under the current immi-
gration system.  He was legally able to complete three levels of U.S.
education, yet he is barred from gaining employment and from mak-
ing meaningful contributions to society due to his undocumented
status.12
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court decided that undocumented
children could not be denied the benefit of free primary and secon-
dary education.13  The Court stated that children should not be pun-
ished for the wrongdoings of their parents and found that depriving
undocumented children of education would put them at a disadvan-
tage and create a subclass of illiterate people.14  However, stories like
Jose’s highlight the contradiction that the Plyler decision has created
for these undocumented children—they receive the education pro-
vided for by Plyler, yet are denied the opportunity to put it to practi-
cal use.15  The undocumented children protected by Plyler often
continue on to complete college and, in many states, even receive the
9. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to Whether Undocumented Immigrants Are Eligi-
ble for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So. 3d 432, 437 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
10. See, e.g., Opening Brief of the Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California
Re: Motion for Admission of Sergio C. Garcia to the State Bar of California at 1–2, In re Garcia,
315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) [hereinafter Bar Exam’rs Brief]; Jennifer Medina, Al-
lowed to Join the Bar, but Not to Take a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/01/03/us/immigrant-in-us-illegally-may-practice-law-california-court-rules.html; Leitsinger,
supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Can’t Live with ‘Em, Can’t Deport ‘Em: Why Recent
Immigration Reform Efforts Have Failed, 13 NEXUS J. OP. 13, 14–15 (2008) (stating that Con-
gress continually fails to pass much needed immigration reform, leaving the United States with
“a broken immigration system that jeopardizes border security, creates an underclass of exploit-
able workers, . . . and impedes family unity”). See generally Kristina M. Campbell, Imagining a
More Humane Immigration Policy in the Age of Obama: The Use of Plenary Power to Halt the
State Balkanization of Immigration Regulation, 29 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 415 (2010).
12. See Leitsinger, supra note 1; see also Stanglin, supra note 3.
13. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
14. See id.
15. See Laura A. Herna´ndez, Dreams Deferred—Why In-State College Tuition Rates Are Not
a Benefit Under the IIRIRA and How This Interpretation Violates the Spirit of Plyler, 21 COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 527–29 (2012); see also J. Austin Smithson, Comment, Educate
Then Exile: Creating a Double Standard in Education for Plyler Students Who Want to Sit for the
Bar Exam, 11 SCHOLAR 87, 88–90 (2008).
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benefit of in-state college tuition.16  This has created a new subclass
comprised of graduates from American colleges who consider them-
selves American but are legally considered citizens of countries they
have never truly lived in.
While immigration is federally regulated,17 admission to the bar is
controlled by each state individually.18  Those who oppose admitting
undocumented applicants to the bar rely on 8 U.S.C. § 1621.19  The
statute provides that undocumented immigrants are generally not eli-
gible to receive state benefits.20  Such benefits include professional li-
censes provided by a state agency or supplied by appropriated funds.21
While there is some debate over whether a law license is in fact pro-
vided by a state agency or supplied by appropriated funds,22 the two
state supreme courts that have addressed the issue have both held that
law licenses fall within the statute.23 However, even if the statute does
prohibit providing a law license to an undocumented immigrant, states
are given express permission to legislate around the restriction.24
Bar admission guidelines vary from state to state, which furthers
confusion regarding undocumented immigrants’ ability to join the
bar.25  Some states require proof of citizenship while others do not,
which may lead undocumented applicants to believe their status is not
relevant to admission in certain states.26  In a state that does not re-
quire proof of citizenship or immigration status, undocumented appli-
cants may wonder why they would be denied admission after passing
16. See Ann Morse, In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13100 (last revised Dec. 23, 2013).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL,
IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:5.2 (4th ed. 2001).
18. It is widely recognized that the power to admit and discipline attorneys rests solely with
the state’s highest court. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1973); see also, e.g., Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569 & n.18 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977);
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
19. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 411, 110 Stat. 2105, 2268–69 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012)).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).
21. Id. § 1621(c).
22. See infra notes 150–161 and accompanying text. Compare Bar Exam’rs Brief, supra note
10, at 9–16, with Application and Proposed Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States of
America at 5–16, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus
Brief].
23. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d at 126; Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to Whether
Undocumented Immigrants Are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So. 3d 432, 437 (Fla.
2014) (per curiam).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).
25. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N, COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2012 (Erica Moeser & Claire Huismann eds., 2012).
26. See id. at 1–3.
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both the exam and the moral character test.  The recent implementa-
tion of “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (DACA)27—which
assures certain individuals that they will not be deported for two years
and confers the ability to apply for work authorization—furthers the
contradictions in this area.28
In light of the new DACA guidelines and cases such as Jose’s, it is
critical that states clarify the effect of unlawful status on admission to
the bar.  Further, considerations of fairness and the potential societal
benefits from admitting these individuals to the bar show that banning
them based solely on status is not a prudent approach.  This Comment
addresses a small number of individuals—current estimates place un-
documented law school graduates at fewer than one hundred.29
Preventing this specific group of individuals from practicing law de-
prives the United States of their potential contributions and deprives
the individuals of the freedom to live and work in the nation they view
as their home.  While admitting these individuals to the bar is the first
necessary step, providing them with the ability to work legally is the
only way to provide them with the full benefits of a legal license.  This
Comment argues that a new visa category should be created to pro-
vide legal status and work authorization for undocumented individu-
als otherwise eligible for bar admission.  This new visa category would
be modeled after DACA requirements combined with the approach of
8 U.S.C. § 1101, which provides for a certain number of nonimmigrant
visas for professionals employed in specialty occupations.30
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of case history, fed-
eral law, state law, and immigration policy that affect undocumented
applicants to the bar.31  Part III notes complications with federal law,
addresses whether undocumented immigrants are morally unfit, and
suggests two possible approaches to provide qualified undocumented
immigrants with work authorization: (1) an annual allotment of visas
for individuals who meet certain strict criteria and are otherwise eligi-
ble for the bar, but are lacking legal status, or (2) if no visas are allot-
ted, these individuals should receive a specialized category of
27. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Act-
ing Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Boarder Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Napolitano Mem-
orandum], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-
individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf; see also Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals (last
visited Apr. 13, 2014).
28. See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1–3.
29. Raquel Aldana et al., Raising the Bar: Law Schools and Legal Institutions Leading to Edu-
cate Undocumented Students, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 5, 6 (2012).
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2012).
31. See infra notes 37–148 and accompanying text.
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prosecutorial discretion tailored to their circumstances.32  Part IV con-
siders the effects and implications of allowing bar admission to un-
documented immigrants.33
II. BACKGROUND
Due to the complexities of immigration law it is necessary to have
an understanding of different areas of the law in order to assess
whether undocumented immigrants should be admitted to the bar and
granted permission to work as attorneys.  Starting with the landmark
case of Plyler v. Doe the federal government has treated undocu-
mented immigrants who enter the United States as children permis-
sively.34  This approach has continued in the states, many of which
allow these individuals to complete college with the benefits of in-
state tuition and financial aid.35  However, admission to the bar for
noncitizens has been an area of differing caselaw, a fact that has been
further complicated by the development of DACA.36  This Part dis-
cusses this wide range of topics and how they affect undocumented
immigrants seeking admission to the bar.
A. Defining “Undocumented Immigrant”
Before considering the complexities of undocumented immigrants
and bar admission, it is necessary to define what the term “undocu-
mented immigrant” means under federal law.37  There are many dif-
ferent status categories for immigrants and other noncitizens present
in the United States.  An “alien” is defined under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) as “any person not a citizen or national of
the United States.”38  The INA goes on to distinguish between “immi-
32. See infra notes 149–228 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 229–234 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 56–71 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 78–148 and accompanying text.
37. While the terms “illegal alien” and “undocumented immigrant” are synonymous, this
Comment will use the term undocumented immigrant.  There are scholarly and popular concerns
regarding the use of the term illegal alien, specifically that the term is “racially loaded, ambigu-
ous, imprecise, and pejorative.”  Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace
Safety: Reconsidering U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 571, 576 (2004) (footnotes omitted).  Use of the term undocumented immigrants allevi-
ates these concerns. See Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 6 n.8. But see Jon Feere, Language in
the Immigration Debate: Associated Press Pushes Back Against Illegal Alien Activists, MEMORAN-
DUM (Ctr. For Immigration Studies, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2012, at 1, 1, available at http://cis.org/
sites/cis.org/files/feere-language-ap.pdf (stating that the term undocumented immigrant is legally
inaccurate and misrepresents the status of these individuals).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012).
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grant” and “nonimmigrant” aliens.39  Nonimmigrant aliens have been
admitted into the United States, but only on a temporary basis.40  Ex-
amples of nonimmigrant aliens include students, tourists, business visi-
tors, foreign government officials, and temporary workers.41  Most of
the nonimmigrant categories require nonimmigrants to show that they
do not intend to abandon their residence in a foreign country and that
they have some specific purpose in the United States.42  Any legal en-
trant who does not fall under a nonimmigrant category is considered
an immigrant, including permanent resident aliens, who are lawfully
admitted into the United States and legally allowed to reside perma-
nently in the United States.43
In order to qualify for admission into the United States as an immi-
grant, rather than a nonimmigrant, a person must also fall within cer-
tain statutory categories.44  The three main qualifying categories are
family-sponsored immigrants,45 employment-based immigrants,46 and
diversity immigrants.47  An illegal or undocumented immigrant is an
immigrant “without any valid documentation or lawful immigration
status.”48  Undocumented immigrants “enter the United States unlaw-
fully, overstay their nonimmigrant visas, or otherwise violate the spe-
cific terms of their admission or some more general provision of the
immigration law.”49  This Comment focuses on individuals classified
as illegal or undocumented immigrants.50
39. See id. § 1101(a)(15).  All aliens are immigrants other than those who fall into a list of
certain enumerated classes; any who fall into these classes are nonimmigrant aliens. Id.
40. Smithson, supra note 15, at 93 (citing STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFU-
GEE LAW AND POLICY 9 (4th ed. 2005)); Definition of Terms, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/definition-terms (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (defining “nonimmigrant”).
41. See Definition of Terms, supra note 40.
42. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (“[A]n alien having a residence in a foreign country
which he has no intention of abandoning, who is a bona fide student . . . and who seeks to enter
the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing such a course of study
. . . .”); Definition of Terms, supra note 40.
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15), (20); see also Definition of Terms, supra note 40 (defining
“permanent resident alien”).
44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153.  These immigrant preference categories also have strict criteria and
most are capped at a certain level per year. See id.
45. Id. § 1153(a).
46. Id. § 1153(b).
47. Id. § 1153(c).
48. Smithson, supra note 15, at 95 (quoting LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 193).
49. Id. (quoting LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 238).
50. Even when an immigrant lacks legal status to be present in the United States, it is difficult
for any state agency to definitively say that an immigrant is deportable because so much of
immigration law is discretionary and because of the complexity of state and federal interaction
on immigration law offenses. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal
Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L.
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B. Introducing a New Visa Category
Because this Comment suggests the creation of a new visa category
it is necessary to briefly address how a new visa category might be
enacted.  Visa categories are found in the Immigration and Nationality
Act, which is the section of U.S. Code addressing immigration laws.51
Thus, a visa category is a federal statute and follows the same path to
enactment as any other legislation.  First the visa category must be
included in a bill introduced to the House of Representatives or the
Senate.52  The visa category bill must then make it through congres-
sional committees to make it to the floor where it will be voted on.53
If the bill was able to pass one house it would have to make it through
committee and  vote in the other house before being presented to the
President who must sign or veto the bill.54  Passing new visa legislation
would take considerable efforts by political interests groups that sup-
port these undocumented immigrants as well as congressmen to back
and support the bill.55  Thus, creating a new visa category faces the
same path and obstacles as any new legislation.
C. Undocumented Immigrants and Post-Secondary Education:
Beyond Plyler v. Doe
Under current law, no legal barrier prevents undocumented immi-
grants from completing undergraduate degrees or law school.56  In
fact, many states encourage undocumented students to continue their
education, despite their illegal status, by enacting in-state tuition
legislation.57
In the landmark case Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court recognized
the right of undocumented children to receive free primary and secon-
REV. 1819, 1819 (2011).  Given these complexities, the bar admissions process seems an inappro-
priate place to address the legal issues surrounding an individual’s status.
51. Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.
gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act (last visited May 22, 2014).
52. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 25 (4th ed.
2007)
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally id. at 48–65.
56. Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 9; see also Smithson, supra note 15, at 96 (“Under the
current system of government, many undocumented immigrants are provided a path to college
and even law school. . . .  Many students are able to apply to colleges so long as they have a
driver’s license as a form of identification.  Some institutions accept undocumented immigrant
students as international students, while others do not even ask.” (footnotes omitted)).
57. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 16.
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dary public education.58 Plyler involved a class action suit seeking to
permanently enjoin Texas school districts from denying free elemen-
tary and secondary public education to undocumented children.59  The
Court first noted that undocumented immigrants are protected under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
they constitute persons, even if they are not citizens.60  It emphasized
that, because undocumented children cannot affect their parents’
choices and have no control over their status, penalizing them for the
actions of their parents “does not comport with fundamental concep-
tions of justice.”61  While the Court found that undocumented immi-
grants were not a suspect class62 and that education was not a
fundamental right, the importance of education prompted the use of
strict scrutiny.63  Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the State had to
prove its classification furthered a substantial state interest.64  The
Court found that denying education furthered no substantial interest,
as it would impose “a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children
not accountable for their disabling status.”65  Further, “[b]y denying
these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic
possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the
progress of our Nation.”66
58. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of inno-
cent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders,
that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.  No
such showing was made here.”).
59. Id. at 206.  Specifically, the case involved a Texas statute that authorized school districts to
deny enrollment in public schools to undocumented children. Id. at 205.
60. Id. at 210–15.
61. Id. at 219–20.
62. The first case to hold that alienage is a suspect classification subject to close scrutiny was
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), which held state statutes that denied aliens
welfare benefits based on lack of citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause.  While the
appellees in that case had legal status, unlike the undocumented immigrants at issue in this
Comment, the Graham Court stated that alienage was a suspect classification and laid the frame-
work for future protection of immigrant rights. Id.
63. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24 (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class
because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrele-
vancy.’  Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need not justify by compelling necessity
every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its population. . . .  In light of
the[ ] countervailing costs [of denying children a basic education], the discrimination contained
in § 21.031 can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the
State.”).
64. Id. at 224.
65. Id. at 223.
66. Id.
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The State’s economic arguments did not persuade the Court.67
Charging tuition to undocumented children was a “ludicrously ineffec-
tual attempt” at stopping the influx of illegal immigrants into the
State.68  Therefore, it was “difficult to understand precisely what the
State hope[d] to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation
of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the
problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.”69  Addi-
tionally, educating undocumented children was not merely a drain on
state funds, because many would become citizens or gain legal
status.70
While Plyler ensured undocumented children’s right to free elemen-
tary and secondary public education, it also led to a new subclass of
undocumented immigrants commonly referred to as “Plyler stu-
dents.”71 Plyler students have completed elementary and high school
education but have limited higher education options and cannot find
gainful employment post-high school.72
Although Plyler has never been extended to cover post-secondary
education, no legal barrier prevents Plyler students from attending
college or law school, and recent in-state tuition legislation has made
higher education increasingly accessible.73  The legitimacy of these
statutes was strengthened in June 2011 when the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to review a California supreme court case upholding a law
allowing long-term unauthorized immigrant students to receive in-
state tuition if they meet certain requirements.74  Fifteen states now
have similar statutes allowing in-state tuition for undocumented immi-
grant students, with eligibility typically conditioned on attending and
67. In fact, the Court determined that illegal immigrants actually contribute to the economy.
Id. at 228.
68. Id. (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex. 1978)).
69. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
70. See id. (“[T]he record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this
classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents
or citizens of the United States.”).
71. Smithson, supra note 15, at 92; see also Paulo Edmundo Ochoa, Note, Education Without
Documentation: As Plyler Students Reach New Heights, Will Their Status Make Them Morally
Unfit to Practice Law?, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 411, 418 (2012).
72. See Ochoa, supra note 71, at 418; see also Smithson, supra note 15, at 92.
73. See Smithson, supra note 15, at 96; see also Morse, supra note 16.  For more on undocu-
mented immigrants continuing on to law school, see Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 6 (estimating
the number of undocumented students attending law schools as of 2012 to be around one
hundred).
74. Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011), denying cert. to 241 P.3d 855
(Cal. 2010); see also Morse, supra note 16.
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graduating from a state high school.75  Only five states have gone the
opposite route and enacted legislation to explicitly deny undocu-
mented students in-state tuition benefits.76  Some states have further
encouraged undocumented students to pursue post-secondary educa-
tion by enacting state DREAM Acts, which provide undocumented
students with state-funded financial aid to pursue their college
education.77
D. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
One way for undocumented immigrants to obtain work authori-
zation and the possibility of legal status is through prosecutorial
discretion.  Law enforcement agencies—including immigration au-
thorities—have the power of prosecutorial discretion, which allows
them to “decide whether to exercise [their] enforcement powers
against someone.”78  In the immigration context, a beneficiary of
prosecutorial discretion avoids removal proceedings and, in some
cases, may become eligible to apply for work authorization.79  This is
an important tool for immigration authorities because the United
States simply does not have the resources to deport every undocu-
75. The fifteen states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington.
Morse, supra note 16.  The statutes in these states permit undocumented immigrant students to
become eligible for in-state tuition “if they graduate from state high schools, have two to three
years residence in the state, and apply to a state college or university.” Id. In some states, the
students may be required to sign an affidavit promising that they will seek legal immigration
status. Id.
76. The five states that deny undocumented students eligibility for in-state tuition are Ala-
bama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, and South Carolina. Id.
77. See, e.g., 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/16.5 (2012); see also Pepe Lozano, Illinois Governor
Signs State DREAM Act Into Law, PEOPLE’S WORLD (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.peoplesworld.
org/illinois-governor-signs-state-dream-act-into-law; Cindy Von Quednow, California Dream Act
Creates New Hope for Undocumented People Across the State, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Sept.
29, 2012), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2012/sep/29/california-dream-act-creates-new-hope-for-
people.
78. The former Immigration and Naturalization Service provided this definition in 2000.
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 246 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion] (quoting U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION FACT SHEET ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRE-
TION GUIDELINES 1 (2000)). See also id. at 244 (“Prosecutorial discretion extends to decisions
about which offenses or populations to target; whom to stop, interrogate, and arrest; whether to
detain or to release a noncitizen; whether to initiate removal proceedings; whether to execute a
removal order; and various other decisions.”); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Exam-
ining Deferred Action & Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) [here-
inafter Wadhia, Sharing Secrets] (“A favorable exercise of ‘prosecutorial discretion’ identifies the
Department of Homeland Security’s authority to not assert the full scope of the agency’s en-
forcement in each and every case.”).
79. Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 78, at 246.
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mented immigrant.80  Prosecutorial discretion aims to focus limited
law enforcement resources on prosecuting those who are an actual
threat to the United States, and not low-priority individuals.81  De-
ferred action is one of the most common forms of prosecutorial discre-
tion and is predominantly based on humanitarian considerations.82
Recently, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued a
memorandum that included an extensive list of nonexclusive criteria
that ICE agents should consider when exercising prosecutorial discre-
tion, many of which are particularly relevant to undocumented stu-
dents seeking to gain admission to the bar.83  Historically, immigration
enforcement agencies have used deferred action under a veil of se-
crecy,84 but in 2012 the Obama Administration created a new and
very transparent policy for deferred action with the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals program.85
The Obama Administration published an official memo through the
Department of Homeland Security outlining guidelines for
prosecutorial discretion regarding certain young people brought into
80. See Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 78, at 6 (“According to the agency’s own statistics,
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has the resources to remove less than 4% of the
total undocumented population.”).
81. See id. at 15; see also Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors et al. 2 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton, Enforce-
ment Priorities Memorandum] (noting that ICE has limited resources and must prioritize
enforcement).
82. See Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 78, at 248 (“Deferred action.  In every
case where the district director determines that adverse action would be unconscionable because
of the existence of appealing humanitarian factors, he shall recommend consideration for de-
ferred action category.” (quoting (LEGACY) IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV. OPER-
ATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975))).
83. See Morton, Enforcement Priorities Memorandum, supra note 81, at 4.  Such relevant
criteria include: length of the alien’s presence in the United States; circumstances of the alien’s
arrival, particularly if the alien came to the United States as a young child; the alien’s pursuit of
an education in the United States, with particular consideration given to high school graduates
and those who have “successfully pursued or are pursuing a college or advanced degree at a
legitimate institution of higher education in the United States”; the alien’s contributions to the
community; and the alien’s ties to her home country. Id.
84. See Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 78, at 4 (“[W]hile deferred action is one of the
very few discretionary remedies available for noncitizens with compelling equities, it currently
operates as a secret program accessible only to elite lawyers and advocates.”); see also Wadhia,
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 78, at 265 (“While the agency’s historical application of
prosecutorial discretion has in many cases been legitimately driven by resource and humanita-
rian considerations, the absence of oversight, accountability and transparency by the agency has
negatively impacted undocumented noncitizens and their families.”).
85. See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide (Updated), AM. IMMIG. POL’Y
CENTER, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-qa-
guide-updated (last updated Aug. 17, 2012); see also Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27;
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, supra note 27.
844 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:833
the country illegally as children.86  Under the DACA program, the re-
quirements to receive deferred action are that an individual: (1) came
to the United States under the age of sixteen; (2) is not above the age
of thirty and had no valid immigration status on June 15, 2012; (3) has
continuously resided in the United States for at least five years pre-
ceding the date of the memorandum and is present in the United
States on the date of the memorandum; (4) is currently in school,
graduated from high school, obtained a GED, or was honorably dis-
charged from the Armed Forces; and (5) has not been convicted of a
felony, a “significant” misdemeanor, or three or more other misde-
meanors, and does not otherwise pose a threat to national security or
public safety.87
The purpose of DACA is to avoid low-priority cases and, specifi-
cally, to avoid deporting “productive young people to countries where
they may not have lived or even speak the language.”88  Those eligible
for DACA will be protected from removal proceedings for two years
and eligible to apply for a two-year work permit.89  DACA does not
provide lawful immigration status or a path to a green card or citizen-
ship; it merely temporarily prevents deportation and provides the po-
tential for work authorization.90  Because the DACA program stems
from executive power and not legislation, it can be changed or re-
voked by the Executive Branch at any time, making it an unstable
solution.91  The criteria for DACA are clearly drawn from the
DREAM Act92 and attempt to give some respite from fear of deporta-
tion to students who would be eligible for relief under the DREAM
86. Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27.
87. Id. at 1; see also Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All ICE Employees (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Morton, Childhood Entrants
Memorandum].
88. Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1–2 (noting that these young people were
brought to the United States as children and “know only this country as home”).
89. See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, supra note 27.
90. See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27, at 3 (“This memorandum confers no sub-
stantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.  Only the Congress, acting through
its legislative authority, can confer these rights.”).
91. See id. (“It remains for the executive branch . . . to set forth policy for the exercise of
discretion within the framework of existing law.”); see also Morton, Childhood Entrants Memo-
randum, supra note 87, at 2 (stating that the memorandum may be “modified, superseded, or
rescinded at any time without notice”).
92. The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act is a bill that
would provide a path to legal status for certain undocumented youths.  Development, Relief,
and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011). For addi-
tional information on the DREAM Act, see DREAM Act, DREAMACTIVIST, http://www.
dreamactivist.org/text-of-dream-act-legislation/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (“It is critical to note
that the DREAM Act is not law.”).
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Act.93  Many of the undocumented students who end up eligible for
admission to the bar are likely eligible for DACA as well.94  For exam-
ple, Jose Godinez-Samperio has qualified under DACA.95  While eli-
gibility under DACA would provide undocumented bar applicants
with legal work authorization and two years of safety from deporta-
tion, the uncertainty and temporary nature of this relief does not pro-
vide a clear solution to the issue of whether they can or should be
admitted to the bar.96
E. Federal Immigration Law as Applied to State Bar Admissions
Although federal law generally controls immigration,97 states have
authority in certain areas stemming from their traditional police pow-
ers.98  One such area of state control is bar admissions, which is con-
trolled by the supreme court of each state.99  One federal law, 8
U.S.C. § 1621, is particularly relevant when considering the legality of
admitting an undocumented immigrant to the bar.100  This statute pro-
vides that certain categories of unqualified aliens are not eligible for
any state or local public benefit.101  Such benefits include “any grant,
contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by
an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of
a State or local government.”102  The statute allows a state to grant
unlawful aliens such benefits, but only through the enactment of a
state law affirmatively providing for eligibility.103  The argument over
93. See S. 952 § 3(b).
94. See Katherine Tianyue Qu, Current Development, Passing the Legal Bar: State Courts and
the Licensure of Undocumented Immigrants, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959, 972 (2013) (noting
that while some individuals—like Sergio Garcia—are ineligible for DACA, “the vast majority of
affected applicants will become DACA beneficiaries.”).
95. Gary Blankenship, Citizenship Should Not Factor in Bar Admissions, FLA. BAR NEWS
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa
900624829/ed3eef34539e98f385257bba00635d2b!OpenDocument.
96. For additional criticisms of DACA as a remedy for undocumented individuals seeking
admission to the bar, see Adam Wright, Note, Federal Constraints on States’ Ability to License an
Undocumented Immigrant to Practice Law, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 177, 180–81 (2013).
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
98. For an in-depth analysis of the traditional state police power regarding bar admission and
federal preemption issues when it comes to immigration, see Qu, supra note 94, at 964–65.
99. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 25, at 1; see also
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012).
101. Id. § 1621(a).
102. Id. § 1621(c)(1)(A).
103. Id. § 1621(d) (“A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would other-
wise be ineligible under subsection (a) of this section only through the enactment of a State law
after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”).
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this statute’s effect on undocumented immigrants’ eligibility for bar
admissions focuses on definitions of the terms “state agency” and “ap-
propriated funds.”104
F. Admission Requirements for State Bars
Each state individually controls the decision of who to admit or re-
strict from joining its bar.105  While a state has some control over indi-
vidual requirements, every state requires an applicant to pass the
exam portion and a moral fitness and character test.106  The two bar
admission requirements that may prevent undocumented immigrants
from admission are requests for proof of immigration status and pass-
ing the moral character and fitness test.107  Bar admission require-
ments with respect to undocumented immigrants were addressed in In
re Griffiths108 and LeClerc v. Webb.109
In In re Griffiths, the United States Supreme Court held that rules
allowing a person’s alien status to be the sole basis for their disqualifi-
cation from the bar unconstitutionally discriminated against aliens.110
The plaintiff in In re Griffiths was a citizen of the Netherlands married
to a U.S. citizen who was denied permission to sit for the Connecticut
bar solely because she was not a U.S. citizen.111  The Court noted that
“[c]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny” and
thus applied heightened scrutiny to the case.112  While each state has a
constitutionally supported interest in determining whether an appli-
cant is of proper moral character and fitness to practice law, where
there is no question of an applicant’s fitness and the sole disqualifying
factor is citizenship there is no ground for denying admission.113
104. See infra notes 149–161 and accompanying text.
105. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 25, at 1 (show-
ing that bar admissions in each state are controlled by the supreme court of that state and, in
some states, the legislature as well).
106. See id. at vii–x.
107. Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 18–19.
108. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
109. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005).
110. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 718–19, 729.
111. Id. at 718 & n.1.  Notably, the plaintiff had gained resident status through her marriage to
a U.S. citizen but expressed no intent to become a U.S. citizen herself. Id.
112. Id. at 721 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
113. Id. at 722–23.  The court found various arguments by the Connecticut State Bar Examin-
ing Committee unpersuasive. Id. at 724–25.  Of particular note, the argument that an alien
would have conflicting duties and not be able to faithfully represent clients was rejected by the
court for lack of any relevance between immigration status and ability to execute one’s duties as
an attorney. Id.
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The Court held that citizenship is not a requirement to sit for the
bar exam and that exclusion based solely on citizenship is unconstitu-
tional as violating the Equal Protection Clause.114  While this case
made large strides for the rights of immigrants, it applied specifically
to a permanent resident alien and did not address undocumented im-
migrants.115  However, the Court failed to define the term “resident
alien” explicitly and “simply held that a state can not [sic] make a
citizenship requirement for applicants that want to take the state’s bar
examination.”116  Because In re Griffiths is not explicitly limited to
resident aliens, there is room for broad interpretation of the
decision.117
The second case, LeClerc v. Webb, addressed the constitutionality
of a Louisiana bar admission rule making nonimmigrant aliens ineligi-
ble to sit for the bar.118  The plaintiffs were nonimmigrant aliens, with
no permanent residency, who had graduated from foreign law schools
and sought to sit for the Louisiana bar, which required applicants to
be either a citizen or resident alien.119  Despite the holding in In re
Griffiths granting heightened scrutiny to aliens generally, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals found the level of constitutional protection
afforded nonimmigrant aliens was different from that afforded perma-
nent resident aliens.120  It noted that nonimmigrant aliens are distinct
from permanent resident aliens because they have only a temporary
connection to the United States and thus only receive rational-basis
review.121
The court held that under rational-basis review the requirement did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because its classification bore
a rational relationship to Louisiana’s legitimate and substantial state
114. Id. at 729.
115. Id. at 718.
116. Smithson, supra note 15, at 111.
117. Id. at 111, 113 (“[I]f the Court meant for In re Griffiths to be binding solely on perma-
nent resident aliens, then it would have used language signifying its desire.” (quoting Kristin L.
Beckman, Comment, Banned from the Bar: Classification of the Temporary Alien in Louisiana,
51 LOY. L. REV. 139, 157 (2005))).
118. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2005).  As a refresher, nonimmigrant aliens
have been admitted to the United States on a temporary basis (e.g., students, tourists, and busi-
ness visitors). See supra, notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
119. Id. Resident alien was defined as an alien who had “attained permanent resident status
in the United States.” Id. (quoting In re Bourke, 819 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (La. 2002)).
120. See id. at 415 (“Despite some ambiguity in Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that
because Section 3(B) affects only nonimmigrant aliens, it is subject to rational basis review.”).
121. See id. at 415 & nn.22–23.
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interest in regulating the practice of those it admits to its bar.122  The
state bar’s “ability to monitor, regulate, and . . . discipline and sanction
members of the Bar require[d] that it be able to locate lawyers under
its jurisdiction.”123  The court determined it would be more difficult to
locate nonimmigrant aliens who are not residents of the United States
and thus the statute was rationally related to assuring “continuity and
accountability in legal representation.”124
In re Griffiths and LeClerc left states with ambiguous interpreta-
tions regarding how far states can go in limiting eligibility for the bar
based on alien status.  However, it is clear that while a state cannot
restrict admission based on U.S. citizenship alone, they may restrict
admission for nonimmigrant aliens who lack more permanent ties to
the United States, at least in the Fifth Circuit.125
G. Cases Requesting Bar Admission for Undocumented Immigrants
in Florida and California
The cases of Jose Godinez-Samperio in Florida and Sergio Garcia in
California, two undocumented immigrants applying to the bar, have
been widely publicized and are instructive on how other states are
likely to approach the issue.  In Florida, the Board of Bar Examiners
submitted the case of Jose Godinez-Samperio to the Florida Supreme
Court on December 13, 2011, seeking an advisory opinion on whether
his undocumented status should preclude his admission.126  On March
15, 2014, the Florida Supreme Court issued its advisory opinion stat-
ing that unauthorized immigrants are ineligible for admission to the
Florida Bar.127  First, the court noted Florida’s requirement that appli-
cants present either proof of citizenship or a document that shows
their immigration status.128  The court was also careful to clarify that
“[i]n the present case, the issue is not the admission of a particular
122. Id. at 421 (“Section 3(B)’s classification bears a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests—Louisiana’s substantial interest in regulating the practice of those it admits to its
bar.”).
123. Id.
124. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 421.  For example, in the case of a nonimmigrant lawyer returning to
his country of origin, Louisiana would not only have trouble tracking him down, but also would
have questionable jurisdiction over the attorney. Id.
125. See generally In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); LeClerc, 419 F.3d 405.
126. Reply to Bar Applicant’s Response to the Board’s Petition for Advisory Opinion at 6,
Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to Whether Undocumented Immigrants are Eligible for
Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 2014) (No. SC11-2568) [hereinafter Reply to
Applicant’s Response]; see also Past ABA Presidents’ Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae
Brief in Support of the Applicant and Brief of the Amici, Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 134 So. 3d 432
(No. SC11-2568) [hereinafter ABA Presidents’ Amicus Brief].
127. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 134 So. 3d 432 (per curiam).
128. Id. at 433.
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applicant, it is a request for an advisory opinion regarding a clearly
stated question.  The separate issue of the current applicant’s admis-
sion is not before the Court.”129  Addressing the issue of whether 8
U.S.C. § 1621 applied to law licenses, the court determined that be-
cause the court is funded through appropriations, law licenses fall
within the prohibited professional licenses under the statute.130
Although the court took note of the exception in § 1621 allowing a
state to pass legislation specifically allowing issuance of the license to
undocumented immigrants, the court stated that no such law exists in
Florida and thus the argument was not persuasive.131  The court con-
cluded that absent legislative action to allow issuance of professional
licenses to undocumented immigrants in Florida, they “are ineligible
for admission to the Florida Bar. Applicants are required to demon-
strate that they are legally present in the United States.”132  The con-
currence reluctantly agreed that the statutory interpretation was
correct in light of Florida Bar requirements and federal law, but urged
the Florida legislature “to act on this integral policy question and rem-
edy the inequities that the unfortunate decision of this Court will
bring to bear.”133
A similar case was decided in California regarding Sergio C. Garcia,
who passed the state bar examination and the moral character and
fitness test.134  Garcia is undocumented but was approved for and has
been waiting to receive a green card for nineteen years.135  Califor-
nia’s Committee of Bar Examiners submitted a motion to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court requesting admission of Garcia to the bar on
November 9, 2011.136  At oral argument, the court stated that it “had
no law that authorized [it] to grant [Garcia] an attorney’s license.”137
The court made it clear that absent legislative action, its hands were
129. Id. at 433 n.1.
130. Id. at 434.
131. Id. at 435 (“Thus, there is no current State law that meets the requirements of section
1621(d) and permits this Court to issue a law license to an unauthorized immigrant.”).
132. Id. at 437.
133. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 134 So. 3d at 437–38 (Labarga, J., concurring) (per curiam).
134. In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 122 (Cal. 2014); see also U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at
5; Bar Exam’rs Brief, supra note 10, at 1.  For a detailed description of Garcia’s story, see Qu,
supra note 94, at 959–60.
135. In re Garcia, 315 P.3d at 121; see also Emily Green, Calif. Law Allows Undocumented
Immigrants to Practice Law, NPR (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/10/08/230320902/calif-
law-allows-undocumented-immigrants-to-practice-law.
136. Bar Exam’rs Brief, supra note 10, at 2.
137. Bob Egelko, Bill Would Let Undocumented Immigrants Be Lawyers, SFGATE (Sept. 15,
2013, 10:16 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Bill-would-let-undocumented-immigrants-
be-lawyers-4816911.php.
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tied on the matter.138  In response, Assembly Bill 1024 was drafted,
debated, and passed by both the state assembly and state senate and
signed into law by California’s governor on October 5, 2013.139  The
law allows undocumented applicants to be admitted as attorneys140—
explicitly authorizing the Supreme Court of California to “admit as an
attorney at law ‘an applicant who is not lawfully present in the United
States [who] has fulfilled the requirements for admission to practice
law.’”141  The law went into effect on January 1, 2014, and on the next
day, the Supreme Court of California held that it would admit Garcia
to the California state bar.142  Garcia now has his law license, but he
still does not have work authorization (unlike Godinez-Samperio who
has work authorization but no law license).
The court noted that it authorized the bar, and that while each state
has control over bar admissions rules, any state laws are subject to
applicable federal laws or constitutional principles.143  The court held
that the newly passed California statute satisfied the federal require-
ments set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d),144 but declined to further address
interpretations of § 1621(c)(1)(A) regarding whether a law license is a
professional license “provided by an agency of a State or local govern-
ment” in light of the state statute.145  In considering whether there was
any reason under state law to deny Garcia or other qualified undocu-
mented immigrants admission to the bar, the court identified unlawful
138. See id.
139. A.B. 1024, 2013–2014 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); see also Egelko, supra note 137;
Green, supra note 135.
140. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6064 (West 2014); see also Press Release, Office of Governor
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Signs Immigration Legislation (Oct. 5, 2013), available
at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18253.
141. In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 124 (Cal. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 6064(b)).
142. Id. at 134.
143. See id. at 125 (“[E]ven with respect to matters that ordinarily and historically are an
appropriate subject of state regulation—such as a state’s granting or denial of a license to prac-
tice law in the state—when the federal government has enacted a law restricting the right of a
non-United States citizen to obtain such a professional license, under the supremacy clause the
applicable federal statute will necessarily take precedence and prevail over any conflicting state
law.”).
144. Id. at 129.  Specifically, the court found that
by explicitly authorizing a bar applicant ‘who is not lawfully present in the United
States’ to obtain a law license, the statute expressly states that it applies to undocu-
mented immigrants—rather than conferring a benefit generally . . . and thus ‘affirma-
tively provides’ that undocumented immigrants may obtain such a professional license
so as to satisfy the requirements of section 1621(d).  Accordingly, . . . this enactment
removed any obstacle to Garcia’s admission to the State Bar that was posed by section
1621(a) and 1621(c)(1)(A).
Id. (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 127–28.
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presence and ineligibility for legal employment as the two most rele-
vant obstacles.146  The court determined that undocumented presence
in itself does not make an individual ineligible and is not tantamount
to a criminal offense, and further noted that under current immigra-
tion policy these individuals are extremely unlikely to be deported or
sanctioned.147  The court was not concerned by undocumented immi-
grants’ inability to be employed legally and found that as a group this
makes them similar to foreign law students who are not authorized to
work in the United States.148  Thus, inability to be legally employed is
not a justifiable reason for denying bar admission in the opinion of the
Supreme Court of California.
While this case was a victory for Garcia and undocumented appli-
cants in California, it did not address many of the issues surrounding
this debate.  Unless a state passes a statute explicitly allowing the
courts to admit undocumented immigrants in that state, it will still be
unclear whether these individuals are barred by § 1621 or other con-
siderations.  However, based on the Florida Supreme Court’s determi-
nation that § 1621 includes law licenses, it seems the trend will likely
be towards denying bar admission for undocumented immigrants ab-
sent specific state legislation allowing it.  States that wish to admit
these deserving individuals should attempt to pass statutes like Cali-
fornia’s in order to ensure bar eligibility.  However, the likelihood of
such statutes being passed is contingent on a variety of factors and not
at all certain.  Thus, a visa that would grant legal status and employ-
ment eligibility to these individuals would prevent  § 1621 from being
an obstacle, as the individuals would no longer be undocumented and
thus would not fall under the purview of the statute.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Admitting Undocumented Immigrants to the Bar Does Not
Necessarily Violate Federal Law
While federal law does cover the issuance of professional licenses to
undocumented immigrants due to potential ambiguity of the statutory
text and a clause expressly allowing states to legislate around the fed-
eral prohibition, admitting undocumented immigrants to the bar does
not necessarily violate federal law.  Although states traditionally con-
trol bar admissions, federal statute 8 U.S.C. § 1621 may restrict states’
146. Id. at 129–34.
147. In re Garcia, 315 P.3d at 129–31.
148. Id. at 131–34.
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ability to grant law licenses to undocumented immigrants.149  Section
1621 provides that unlawful aliens may not receive state or local bene-
fits, including “any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or com-
mercial license provided by an agency of the State or local
government or by appropriated funds of a State or local govern-
ment.”150  While a law license is a professional license, two key clauses
of the statute determine whether § 1621 applies to undocumented im-
migrants seeking law licenses.
The first question is whether the issuing authority is “an agency of
the State or local government,”151 but § 1621 does not provide any
text or legislative history defining “agency.”152  Other federal statutes
define agency as expressly excluding the courts,153 and Supreme Court
precedent supports this interpretation.154  Absent any federal statutes
or other relevant sources defining agency as including state supreme
courts, the term should be interpreted consistently with its use in
other federal statutes.
Section 1621 also prohibits benefits to undocumented immigrants
that are provided by “appropriated funds of a State or local govern-
ment.”155  Thus, the second question is whether the issuing of a law
license is funded by appropriated means—a question that turns
largely on interpretation of the word “appropriated.”  There were a
number of interpretations of the word appropriated offered by both
sides in the Garcia case and the Godinez-Samperio case.156  However,
based on the California Supreme Court’s determination that it could
not admit Garcia absent legislative action157 and the Florida Supreme
Court’s advisory opinion stating undocumented immigrants cannot be
149. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. Bar Exam’rs Brief, supra note 10, at 9–10. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1621.
153. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (stating that the term “agency” does not include “the courts of
the United States”).
154. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 699–700 (1995) (“In ordinary parlance,
federal courts are not described as ‘departments’ or ‘agencies’ of the Government.  As noted by
the Sixth Circuit, it would be strange indeed to refer to a court as an ‘agency.’ . . .  This common-
sense reading is bolstered by the statutory definitions of ‘department’ and ‘agency’ set forth at 18
U.S.C. § 6.”).
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A).
156. For an in-depth analysis of the arguments asserted by the Department of Justice and
supporters of Sergio Garcia regarding interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1621 and the meaning of ap-
propriated, see Wright, supra note 96, at 182–89.  For an opposing argument that § 1621 does not
include law license based on statutory interpretation and congressional intent, see Qu, supra
note 94 at 962–66.  However, in light of the developments in Florida and California that hap-
pened after Qu’s article was published, it seems most persuasive that the statute does apply.
157. See supra notes 134–148 and accompanying text.
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admitted to the Florida Bar unless the legislature acts,158 it seems
likely that subsequent state supreme courts will also find that law li-
censes are supplied through appropriated funds and thus fall under
§ 1621.
As previously noted, even if § 1621 prevents undocumented immi-
grants from being issued law licenses on its face, the statute allows
states to legislate around the prohibition.159  States are free to provide
law licenses to undocumented immigrants if they so choose.160  To
avoid ambiguity or confusion, any state that wishes to issue law li-
censes to qualified undocumented individuals should attempt to pass
legislation explicitly authorizing the practice.  For example, Assembly
Bill 1024 allows the Supreme Court of California to license lawyers
regardless of their immigration status.161  Enacting such legislation
falls within the legal rights provided by § 1621 and would work as a
safeguard for undocumented applicants in the event of challenges to
their eligibility under federal law.
B. State Bar Admission Requirements Do Not Preclude Admission
It is also necessary to determine whether any state bar admission
laws prohibit admitting undocumented immigrants to the bar.  States
vary regarding specific admission requirements, but those rules that
are common to every state do not necessarily preclude undocumented
immigrants.162  The exam requirement provides no particular hurdle
for undocumented immigrants who have graduated from American
law schools.  They are in the same position regarding the exam por-
tion as any other law school graduate.  The two areas most likely to
prevent bar admission for an undocumented student are requests for
immigration status or social security numbers and the character and
fitness test.163
1. State Bar Admissions and Citizenship Requirements
The immigration status required for bar admission is largely unclear
and varies state by state.164  The precedents established in In re Grif-
158. See supra notes 126–133 and accompanying text.
159. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).
160. Egelko, supra note 137; see also Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown
Jr., supra note 140.
161. A.B. 1024, 2013–2014 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); see also Egelko, supra note 137;
Green, supra note 135.
162. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 25, at 1–3.
163. Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 18–19.
164. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 25, at 1–3.
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fiths and LeClerc165 leave undocumented immigrants seeking bar ad-
mission “largely unprotected by the U.S. [C]onstitution.”166  In In re
Griffiths, the Supreme Court held that citizenship cannot be a require-
ment for bar admission but left the issue of an alien’s specific status
open to broad interpretation.167  In LeClerc, the Fifth Circuit found
Louisiana could deny bar admission to nonimmigrant aliens, but this is
a state-by-state decision and the precedent is not binding beyond the
Fifth Circuit.168  Given the outcomes of these cases, it is evident that
states have the ability to determine which candidates to find admissi-
ble, but there are limitations on what they can use as exclusionary
classification.169
While many states explicitly exclude undocumented students from
sitting for the bar through statute or practice, not all do.170  Several
states request information regarding immigration status and automati-
cally bar those who are not nonimmigrants authorized to work in the
United States.171  Clearly, those states may refuse admission to an un-
documented immigrant because she lacks legal status, and the state is
within its constitutional rights to preclude her based on the LeClerc
precedent.172  Other states simply ask for the applicant’s citizenship or
nationality but do not inquire into actual immigration status.173  A few
states do not ask about citizenship or immigration status at all.174
While each state may vary its immigration status requirements, un-
documented immigrants should be considered for admission in all
states because they are arguably more analogous to the resident alien
in In re Griffiths, who had sufficient permanency and ties to the
United States, than the nonimmigrant aliens in LeClerc.  The similar-
ity to resident aliens is based on considerations of residency, national
loyalties and ties, education, permanency, and the state’s ability to
monitor the professional activities of those admitted to the bar.  It is
165. See supra notes 105–125 and accompanying text.
166. Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 17.
167. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 (1973); see also Smithson, supra note 15, at 111 (“No-
where in the opinion does Justice Powell suggest that the term ‘resident alien’ is limited to some-
one who entered the country and remains here only on a temporary or immigrant visa. . . .  The
Court’s failure to address the issue relating to the immigration status of the alien leaves room for
a broad interpretation of the law in Griffiths.”).
168. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005).
169. See Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 17.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 19.
172. See id.
173. Id. (listing Alaska, Delaware, and Iowa).
174. Id. at 19 (listing California, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, and Massachusetts as states that do not ask about immigration status).
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important to note that the outcome in LeClerc is only binding on the
Fifth Circuit and seems at odds with the declaration in In re Griffiths
that classification based on alienage is suspect.175  Further, because In
re Griffiths is not explicitly restricted to resident aliens, the Court’s
reasoning can be extended to undocumented immigrants.176
Opponents to the admission of undocumented immigrants rely on
LeClerc when making the argument that because undocumented im-
migrants are still citizens of another nation and face the potential of
deportation proceedings, they are of a transient nature and a state
should be able to restrict them from joining the bar.177  However, in In
re Griffiths, the Supreme Court downplayed the significance of the
alien plaintiff’s potentially transient nature and ability to return to her
native country at any time.178
It is true that undocumented immigrants differ from the plaintiff in
In re Griffiths because they are at risk of deportation; however, con-
sidering the actualities of the immigration system in the United States,
this risk is no greater than that of any attorney deciding to move out
of state.179  Additionally, the class of immigrants in question is a low
priority for deportation proceedings, and the Department of Home-
land Security has acknowledged that these individuals are productive
members of society and realistically cannot be deported to countries
where they have never resided and do not speak the language.180  Fur-
ther, aliens in the United States on student visas are permitted to
graduate from U.S. law schools and be admitted to the bar—even if
they do not intend to practice law in the United States or cannot get
approval from immigration authorities to extend their visas.181  Thus,
175. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973).
176. Smithson, supra note 15, at 113 (“The law handed down in the Griffiths decision is not
limited to resident aliens.  ‘[I]f the Court meant for In re Griffiths to be binding solely on perma-
nent resident aliens, then it would have used language signifying its desire.’  While the Griffiths
case concerns resident aliens and not illegal aliens, it provides a logical line of reasoning that aids
in answering the question of whether undocumented students should be able to sit for the bar
exam.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Beckman, supra note 117, at
157–58)).
177. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415 (5th Cir. 2005).
178. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 718 n.1 (noting that the plaintiff had not filed for citizen-
ship status and had no intent of doing so); see also Smithson, supra note 15, at 115 (“[T]he
governing case law has downplayed the significance of an alien’s transient nature.”).
179. Smithson, supra note 15, at 115.
180. Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1–2.
181. ABA Presidents’ Amicus Brief, supra note 126, at 7 (“Upon graduation, a foreign stu-
dent may take the Florida bar exam and, after passing and demonstrating good character, be
admitted to The Florida Bar—even if not intending to practice law in Florida, and even if unable
to get approval from immigration authorities to remain in the country.”).
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there is little reason to deny admission to an undocumented immi-
grant who is unlikely to leave the country.182
Additionally, concerns of national loyalty and ties to the United
States do not apply to the undocumented immigrants in question.
Many undocumented immigrants, particularly those who have made it
as far as sitting for the bar exam, are equally assimilated into U.S.
culture and society as any citizen.  These individuals view themselves
as Americans and have strong ties and loyalty to the United States.183
For the undocumented student who came as a baby or child to the
United States and who has been raised exclusively in this society,
his or her belonging in U.S. society is indistinguishable, and perhaps
even more profound than that of a recently arrived legal resident or
even a U.S. citizen who has spent part or most of his life living
abroad.184
Given the unlikelihood of deportation, Plyler students should be af-
forded the same benefit of eligibility for bar admission as resident or
nonimmigrant aliens.  Further, denying admission based solely on im-
migration status is problematic because the law and public policy in
this area are constantly changing.  The only mandatory requirements
for bar admission are proper education, passing the bar exam, and
good moral character.  States should make these the only considera-
tions and not base denial of admission to practice law on “transitory
changes in government policy.”185
2. Undocumented Status Does Not Necessarily Violate the Character
and Moral Fitness Requirement
All fifty states have character and fitness rules for bar admission.186
Good moral character is generally defined as “qualities of honesty,
fairness, candor, trustworthiness, observance of fiduciary responsibil-
ity, respect for and obedience to the law, and respect for the rights of
182. The Supreme Court of California held that undocumented immigrants are akin to foreign
students in their recent decision on this issue. In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 133 (Cal. 2014)
(“[F]oreign law students who have passed the California bar examination and have been certi-
fied to this court by the Committee have been admitted to the State Bar, even though such
individuals may lack authorization to work in the United States.  Although it may be reasonable
to assume that most foreign law students, when licensed, will return to their home countries to
practice law, . . . [we] do not condition or limit their law licenses.  We conclude it is appropriate
to treat qualified undocumented immigrants in the same manner.”).
183. Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 11 (“[T]hey have built deep cultural and social roots in
the United States that we cannot simply ignore today.”).
184. Id.
185. Reply Brief of Applicant Sergio C. Garcia at 17–18, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (No.
S202512) [hereinafter Reply Brief].  For commentary on the problematic nture of making bar
admission contingent on transitory immigration laws and status, see Qu, supra note 94, at 977.
186. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 25.
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others and the judicial process.”187  The two areas most likely to cause
issues for undocumented applicants are respect for and obedience to
the law and honesty and candor.
Because undocumented applicants are technically in violation of
federal law it is first necessary to address the issue of their illegal sta-
tus as an act of disobedience against the law.  Under federal law,
crossing the border without authorization is a civil immigration viola-
tion, regardless of a person’s age.188  However, Congress has recog-
nized that children do not have control over their crossing and does
not penalize them until they turn eighteen—and then, only if they re-
main in the United States.189  For this reason, when evaluating who
entered illegally or overstayed a visa, bar admission committees
should evaluate the age and circumstances of the applicant when she
entered the United States.190
Considering the age and circumstances of the offense is the same
approach applied to all applicants, and thus should also be applied to
undocumented immigrants.191  Thus, although the technical violation
of federal law is relevant to a moral character inquiry, it should not be
outcome determinative.  Based on the fact that both Jose Godinez-
Samperio and Sergio Garcia were found morally fit for admission not-
withstanding their undocumented status, it seems that this holistic ap-
proach is being embraced and accepted by state bar admission
boards.192
187. Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 23 (quoting CAL. STATE BAR R. 4.40(B) (West 2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Id. at 25.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 26 (“In evaluating good moral character, . . . Bar Rules and Committees should use
age at the time of conduct and recency of conduct to create, at a minimum, a bright line exemp-
tion for the unlawful border crossing of those who came to the U.S. as children.”).
191. See Qu, supra note 94, at 970–71 (“Because the evaluation is a holistic assessment, any
potentially adverse evidence is weighed under the totality of the circumstances.  While the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners recommends that revelation of behavior such as unlawful
conduct, making of false statements, acts involving dishonesty, and alcohol dependency should
be ‘treated as cause for further inquiry,’ bar examiners should also take into account mitigating
factors in assigning significance that includes: ‘the applicant’s age at the time of the conduct, the
recency of the conduct, . . . the cumulative effect of conduct or information, the evidence of
rehabilitation, the applicant’s positive social contributions since the conduct, [and] the applicant’s
candor in the admissions process.’” (alterations in original) (quoting NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 25, at viii–ix)).
192. Id. at 971 (“Undocumented attorneys are subject to the same rigorous background
checks and professional standards as all lawyers.  The California and Florida State Bars have
deemed that Garcia and Godinez-Samperio passed their character and fitness evaluations not-
withstanding their undocumented status.  While their unauthorized presence undoubtedly con-
stituted a factor in the screening, the investigatory bodies found that the positive elements in the
men’s applications outweighed any adverse consequences that may have resulted from their im-
migration violations.” (footnote omitted)).
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The second area of the moral character and fitness test that may
cause problems for undocumented immigrants is the requirement of
honesty and candor.  This area is less complex than the question of
illegal behavior, as there is no lack of candor where an undocumented
applicant openly submits her status for scrutiny.  Provided a student
divulged her status, thus meeting the requirement of honesty, she
should not be found morally unfit based solely on her undocumented
status.193  However, where an individual has not complied with an or-
der of deportation, denial based on failure to meet moral character
and fitness would be reasonable.
C. Employment Eligibility Is a Significant Concern and Valid
Ground for Precluding Bar Admission
Even if undocumented students are not explicitly precluded from
the bar based on federal law or state admissions requirements, there
are still major policy issues affecting admission of these individuals.
The primary concern is that federal law prohibits employers from hir-
ing undocumented workers.194  Further, admission to the bar in no
way provides a permit to work and does not immunize an individual
from deportation proceedings or other federal sanctions.195  Admis-
sion to the bar merely certifies that the state has found an individual
qualified to work as a lawyer, which each state has the right to do.
The fact that an individual licensed as a lawyer cannot legally obtain
gainful employment is a valid concern for state bar admissions, as con-
cerns about employability closely resemble the legitimate state inter-
ests in the ability to control professionals and to monitor employment
in LeClerc.196
While admission to the bar does not confer a legal right to work,
some employers and clients might mistakenly presume that it does.197
Those who unknowingly employ an undocumented immigrant are vul-
nerable under federal law and may put clients at risk.198  Additionally,
if the bar begins licensing unemployable attorneys, the integrity of the
bar may be questioned; it may even be seen as state approval of the
unauthorized practice of law.  To address this, some suggest that, in
theory, licensed undocumented immigrants could work as contractors
193. Ochoa, supra note 71, at 442 (“[M]oral character is not inherently flawed based solely on
their status, as they demonstrate candor and trustworthiness by honestly revealing their undocu-
mented status.”).
194. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10 (2012).
195. See Bar Exam’rs Brief, supra note 10, at 19–20.
196. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005).
197. See Bar Exam’rs Brief, supra note 10, at 19–24.
198. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a; 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10; see also U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 14.
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or from another country for clients with business in the state where
they are licensed.199  While theoretically possible, these solutions are
very limited and still deny undocumented immigrants the ability to
put their legal education and training to practical use.200  Creation of a
new visa category for these individuals providing work authorization
would entirely solve this issue rather than attempt to find ways around
it.
D. Providing Employment Eligibility for Undocumented
Bar Applicants
Working under the assumption that eligibility for legal employment
as an attorney should be the determinative issue, the next concern is
how an undocumented immigrant can obtain employment eligibility.
This is an issue even for those like Garcia who are already admitted to
the bar because without the ability to be employed legally they cannot
put their law license to use.  This subpart considers current methods
for obtaining legal work authorization and suggests new possibilities.
1. DACA
Currently, DACA is the only means by which an undocumented im-
migrant may obtain eligibility for employment.201  Although DACA is
only a temporary fix,202 it does provide undocumented immigrants the
opportunity for legal employment in renewable two-year incre-
ments.203  A DACA-qualified immigrant who has met the education,
exam, and moral fitness requirements of the bar seemingly should not
be precluded from receiving a law license.204  However, as shown in
Florida, because DACA does not provide actual legal status205 it is not
enough to get around 8 U.S.C. § 1621.206  In California and any other
state that chooses to create a legislative exception to § 1621, DACA is
a more useful form of relief since it does provide employment eligibil-
199. See, e.g., Qu, supra note 94, at 968.
200. For a discussion of the benefits a law license provides undocumented immigrants even
where they cannot be legally employed, see Qu, supra note 94, at 967–70.
201. See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27.
202. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
203. Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27, at 2.
204. This is Jose Godinez-Samperio’s status, but the Florida Supreme Court determined his
undocumented status makes him inadmissible.  Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to
Whether Undocumented Immigrants are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So. 3d 432
(Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
205. See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27, at 3.
206. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 134 So. 3d at 437 (per curiam).
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ity for two years but is still not entirely satisfactory due to its tempo-
rary nature.207
2. Additional Methods of Gaining Employment Eligibility
While DACA provides a short-term remedy for many undocu-
mented applicants, it does not cover all who are otherwise eligible for
bar admission, necessitating other means for employment eligibil-
ity.208  Many of the arguments against passing the DREAM Act, and
comprehensive immigration reform, focus on not providing incentives
to immigrate illegally.209  However, only a handful of undocumented
students attend college and then earn law degrees.210  Arguments of
incentivizing more illegal immigration are also easily countered by the
fact that it is highly unlikely many immigrants will enter the United
States illegally with the sole intention of getting their children to be-
come lawyers.211  Additionally, those who graduate from law school
have overcome substantial obstacles—language barriers, cultural dif-
ferences, and inadequate finances—“[i]mposing a blanket ban on
their admission to the Bar would be a waste of exceptional talent for
[the legal] profession.”212
These humane and social considerations, coupled with the unlikeli-
hood of deportation, evidence the need for additional methods of ob-
taining employment eligibility.  This Comment suggest two new
methods to allow a path to legal employment for undocumented im-
migrants: (1) an additional specialized form of deferred action should
be enacted, or (2) Congress should create a new category for allotting
professional employment-based visas.
Creating a specified class eligible for deferred action would tempo-
rarily provide these individuals with work permits, but like DACA it
would not provide a permanent solution.  A deferred action program
for undocumented law school graduates should enforce the same re-
quirements as DACA but remove the age limit of thirty—as many
207. See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 27.
208. For example, Sergio Garcia was admitted to the bar but did not qualify for DACA due to
his age. In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 132 n.18 (Cal. 2014).
209. See Ochoa, supra note 71, at 438–40.
210. See Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 6.
211. Ochoa, supra note 71, at 439 (“Although possible, it seems unlikely that a person would
risk entering illegally solely so his or her child may practice law.”); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 228 (1982) (“The dominant incentive for illegal entry . . . is the availability of employment;
few if any illegal immigrants come to this country . . . in order to avail themselves of a free
education.”).
212. ABA Presidents’ Amicus Brief, supra note 126, at 6; see also Ochoa, supra note 71, at 435
(“[M]any undocumented immigrants often overcome extraordinary obstacles to fulfill their
dreams of a higher education and have amazing stories of determination and perseverance.”).
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individuals take time off between undergraduate education and legal
education—and require graduation from law school in the United
States.  This would allow law graduates who are past the eligible age
for DACA to gain work eligibility and other benefits.
The second, more permanent solution is to create a new visa cate-
gory for undocumented law school graduates otherwise eligible for
bar admission.  While creating a new visa category may be viewed as a
drastic policy decision, in light of the merits of these individuals and
the realities of the immigration system a new visa category is the most
effective remedy.  Given the difficulties of passing wholesale immigra-
tion reform, providing a remedy for this small and specific group of
undocumented immigrants seems reasonable in light of their distinct
circumstances.  Graduating from law school is no simple task even for
citizens with the full range of government aid and loans available to
them.  For an undocumented immigrant to graduate law school and
proceed to pass the exam portion of the bar indicates an extreme level
of perseverance and ability that should not be disregarded.  Granting
these individuals legal status through an individualized visa program
would give them “an opportunity to repay a nation that already in-
vested in their education.”213
The current U.S. visa system seeks to encourage certain talented
individuals to enter the United States on nonimmigrant visas.  For ex-
ample, there are nonimmigrant visas available for those with “ex-
traordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or
athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or inter-
national acclaim . . . and seeks to enter the United States to continue
work in the area of extraordinary ability.”214  There are also nonimmi-
grant visa categories allowing for professional athletes and fashion
models to legally reside in the United States.215
Beyond nonimmigrant visas U.S. immigration statutes also provide
for employment-based immigration, which means the recipients be-
come legal permanent residents as a condition of receiving the green
card.  For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 provides for a certain number of
preference allocated visas for employment-based immigrants.216  Sec-
tion 1153 lists a number of types of employment-based preference but
particularly relevant here is the category for aliens who hold advanced
213. Smithson, supra note 15, at 118.
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(O)(i) (2012).
215. Id.; see also id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(1).
216. Id. § 1153(b).
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degrees.217  The statute allots a certain number of visas to “qualified
immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced de-
grees or their equivalent.”218  This immigrant category closely corre-
lates to the skillset of the undocumented immigrants addressed in this
Comment.  The United States has created these visas in order to en-
courage certain skilled workers to enter the country.  However, the
individuals addressed here are equally skilled and seem to be more
worthy of receiving legal nonimmigrant status over someone who has
never been to the country.  Further, a small group of individuals is
affected; thus the number of visas set aside for the category would be
minimal.219
Additionally, the United States has a diversity immigrant visa pro-
gram, also referred to as the green card lottery.  This system allows
“up to 50,000 immigrant visas available annually, drawn from random
selection among all entries to individuals who are from countries with
low rates of immigration to the United States.”220  As Smithson aptly
noted, “[i]f a change in the law is to take place, then what is the differ-
ence between allowing these educated and Americanized undocu-
mented immigrants an opportunity to work in the country legally
versus the free-for-all distribution of 55,000 green cards in the green
card lottery?”221  Creating a new visa category for undocumented law
school graduates would require drastic lobbying and legislative
changes but it would also allow these individuals to use their United
States-funded education to benefit the country.  In light of the above
considerations and the other visa categories that already exist, a pro-
posed visa category to make these undocumented individuals legal
nonimmigrants with work authorization falls reasonably within expec-
tations for immigration statues.
The visa category this Comment proposes would combine the
DACA requirements with the approach of 8 U.S.C. § 1101, which pro-
vides for a certain number of nonimmigrant visas for professionals
employed in specialty occupations.222  This specialty occupation non-
217. Id. § 1153(b)(2) (providing a preference category for aliens who are members of a profes-
sion requiring advanced degrees or of exceptional ability).
218. Id. § 1153(b)(2)(A).
219. See Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 6.
220. Green Card Through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IM-
MIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/other-ways-get-green-card/green-card-through-
diversity-immigration-visa-program/green-card-through-diversity-immigrant-visa-program (last
visited May 22, 2014).
221. See Smithson, supra note 15, at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H).
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immigrant visa is commonly referred to as the H-1B category.223  The
term specialty occupation is defined as an occupation that requires
“(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly special-
ized knowledge, and (B) attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree
in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into
the occupation in the United States.”224  These nonimmigrant visas
are available for up to three years initially and extendable for a maxi-
mum of six years.
Congress should create a preference category with a very small
number of visas available for individuals who can prove they: (1) en-
tered the United States before the age of sixteen; (2) have continu-
ously resided in the United States for at least five years preceding
enactment of the program; (3) have successfully graduated from a
U.S. high school, undergraduate institution, and law school; (4) are
otherwise fit to gain admission to the bar; and (5) meet the qualifica-
tion of employment eligibility in a specialty occupation.225  By provid-
ing these individuals with visas and employment eligibility, the
government would allow these individuals to put their U.S. education
to use without providing any incentives to immigrate illegally.  Re-
quiring that they meet the qualification of employment eligibility in a
specialty occupation will ensure that this will only cover those appli-
cants who are actually admissible to the bar.  This approach could also
be expanded to include other professions that require licensing, which
would provide an equitable solution for a wider range of accom-
plished undocumented immigrants.  For example, rather than specifi-
cally requiring that the individuals graduate from a U.S. law school,
the statute could require that the individuals graduate from a U.S.
professional school or PhD program.
While the H-1B category requires the prospective employer to peti-
tion and file a labor condition application,226 this new visa category
should allow the applicants to self-petition given the other strict crite-
ria it would enforce.  Allowing these individuals nonimmigrant legal
status would open potential pathways to adjusting to legal permanent
resident status.  Particularly, candidates eligible for the nonimmigrant
visa should be allowed to adjust to permanent resident status after a
223. Understanding H1-B Requirements, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.us-
cis.gov/eir/visa-guide/h-1b-specialty-occupation/understanding-h-1b-requirements (last visited
May 22, 2014).
224. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1).
225. These requirements are based on the DACA guideline, but remove the age restriction to
allow for law students who may have taken time off prior to school. See Napolitano Memoran-
dum, supra note 27, at 1.
226. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H).
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certain amount of time.  Providing these individuals with nonimmi-
grant visas rather than legal permanent resident status would strike a
balance between perceived incentivizing of illegal immigration and
providing a reasonable solution to the limbo that currently exists for
these individuals.  If they meet the time requirement as nonimmi-
grants, they can adjust to permanent legal residency—and eventually
citizenship—without gaining those benefits immediately.
Incentivizing illegal immigration is avoided through the entry age
limitation, minimum number of years of residency, and the educa-
tional requirements.  These requirements mirror the DACA specifica-
tions and would limit eligibility to Plyler students.  However, by not
enforcing the maximum age of thirty, undocumented students that
took time off between college and law school would still be eligible for
the visa and not precluded as they are with DACA.  An individual like
Sergio Garcia, who has been present in the United States for a long
period of time but happens to be over the DACA age limit, should not
be ineligible for routes to legal employment, especially considering his
achievements in a professional field.  Using the specialty occupation
requirements from the H-1B category further ensures that all eligible
individuals can contribute positively to the United States.  As a non-
immigrant category this visa would only provide a green card, not an
automatic path to citizenship, thus it strikes a balance between al-
lowing these individuals to become productive members of society
and the concerns of many who do not want citizen fast tracks for un-
documented immigrants.
Only a very small portion of undocumented immigrants would qual-
ify under these criteria—specifically, those who have arguably earned
the right to be legally employed and to gain professional certification.
While this solution may be considered extreme, it better utilizes the
allotment of nonimmigrant visas available each year by rewarding
hard working individuals who have demonstrated their commitment
to becoming productive members of U.S. society.227  Significantly, if
this sort of visa were available, qualified undocumented immigrants
would no longer be of illegal status and would be eligible for legal
employment, thus negating any obstacle to their admission to state
bars.  For an individual like Sergio Garcia, who has already waited
227. Arguably, these individuals are more worthy of legal status, even as nonimmigrants, than
those who enter each year through the U.S. “green card lottery” program. See Smithson, supra
note 15, at 125.
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nineteen years for the government to process his green card,228 this
new category would finally allow him to practice law.
IV. IMPACT
While there are several possible objections to allowing undocu-
mented immigrants to become practicing attorneys, if an individual
can gain employment eligibility these arguments are no longer causes
for concern.
A. Implications for the Legal Profession
Another area of concern is the potential for negative implications
regarding the legal profession.  The first concern is that the already
overcrowded legal profession does not need more attorneys.  This
concern can easily be overcome by noting that allowing undocu-
mented immigrants admission to the bar will not create a sudden in-
flux of a large number of new attorneys.  The estimated number of
undocumented individuals who have even attended law school is low,
with best estimates around one hundred.229  Following the idea that
these are valuable candidates for entry to the legal profession, provid-
ing these individuals with a path to legal status is not a “hand-out.”230
B. A Chance for State Bars to Take a Stance
Finally, this situation provides an important opportunity for state
bars to weigh in on the immigration reform issue.  At a time when the
Congress is considering vast overhauls of the immigration system state
bars have a chance to make their stance clear.  By admitting undocu-
mented immigrants, they can choose to indicate to society and the po-
litical world that these are worthy, accomplished individuals who
deserve to be granted legal status.  This would send an important mes-
sage during this time of immigration reform by supporting undocu-
mented immigrants who are deserving of legal status.  It would also
show that the bar, historically an exclusive association, is open and
available to all qualified candidates, not only select ones.  Further, the
228. Robin Abcarian, Sergio Garcia Will Practice Law, and He Will Make a Killing, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sergio-garcia-law-20130906,
0,2936482.story?page=1 (“His application for a green card has been pending for the last 19 years,
since Nov. 18, 1994.  At the rate the feds are processing applications, he thinks he will receive his
card in 2019, sometime around his 41st birthday.”).
229. Aldana et al., supra note 29, at 6.
230. Smithson, supra note 15, at 117–18, 118 n.220 (noting the fact that “this specific group of
undocumented immigrants have worked their way to where they are today and enabling them to
become legal residents or citizens of the United States would benefit the country” (citing EDUC.
SECTOR, REWARD HARD-WORKING IMMIGRANT STUDENTS 1 (2007))).
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law may be viewed as a changing, flexible mechanism that adapts with
changing societal attitudes in different states.  Rules are tools that de-
cision makers can use to help come to what seems like a fair result.
Many state bars have consistently held that the only requirements to
practice law are “a proper education and good moral character” and
have rejected immigration status as a relevant criterion.231  This Com-
ment argues that this would be the ideal approach in all states for the
above reasons, but the likelihood of more conservative states allowing
undocumented immigrants admission to the bar is low.
While one segment of society feels sympathy for these undocu-
mented immigrants, the other segment may view them as not entitled
to admission based on not wanting to provide societal benefits to
those here illegally, regardless of circumstances.  This value determi-
nation of providing or not providing societal benefits is likely an un-
derlying and unstated factor in many state bar decisions on this
matter.  As stated above, applying a holistic approach in evaluating
undocumented applicants for bar admission would be the most equita-
ble approach, and the one all states should apply.  California and Flor-
ida have already begun to use this holistic consideration process,232
but the supreme courts in those states have declared that undocu-
mented status prevents them from issuing law licenses to otherwise
qualified candidates unless there is state legislation specifically al-
lowing it.233
C. Applying a New Visa Category to the Current Context
Because of the complex nature of the interplay between undocu-
mented status, employment authorization, 8 U.S.C. § 1621, and indi-
vidual state immigration requirements for bar admission, an approach
that can provide these individuals with legal status is ideal.  Under
current standards there are three possibilities for undocumented indi-
viduals seeking bar admission: (1) in a state that has passed legislation
to make § 1621 inapplicable, undocumented applicants should have
no issue being admitted to the bar, but may not have work authoriza-
tion if they do not qualify for DACA; (2) in a state that has not passed
legislation to make § 1621 inapplicable but does not have restrictions
on immigrant status for admission, the state supreme court likely will
not admit undocumented applicants, even if they have work authori-
231. Reply Brief, supra note 185, at 29.
232. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
233. In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 127–29 (Cal. 2014); Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to
Whether Undocumented Immigrants are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So. 3d 432,
433–34 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
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zation; and (3) in states that do restrict admission based on immigra-
tion status, undocumented immigrants will not be admissible at all.
Under these circumstances, an undocumented bar applicant may be
admitted to the bar but not be able to work as an attorney (for exam-
ple, Sergio Garcia).  The other possibility is that an undocumented
applicant will have work authorization but will be inadmissible pursu-
ant to § 1621 (for example, Jose Godinez-Samperio).
Because neither of these outcomes properly reconciles the federal
government’s policy of condoning these individual’s presence by pro-
viding work authorization with the federal law preventing them from
receiving a professional license, a visa that provides both legal status
and employment eligibility is necessary.  If this new visa was enacted it
would allow Jose Godinez-Samperio to be admitted to the Florida Bar
even if the state legislature does not choose to enact legislation for the
§ 1621 exception.  Because he already qualified for DACA Jose would
have no trouble meeting the age and residency requirements of the
visa.  He graduated from a U.S. high school, undergraduate college,
and law school and he has been found fit for bar admission other than
his undocumented status, thus meeting the specialty occupation re-
quirements of the visa.  If this visa category were available Jose could
have applied for it after graduating from law school and would have
met all of the requirements.  This would provide him not only with
legal employment eligibility, so that he can put his legal license to
whatever use he chooses, but also with legal status.  Legal status
would allow him to be admitted to the Florida Bar even without legis-
lation specifically allowing it, and would eventually provide him with
the possibility of permanent legal status.  The visa would finally allow
Jose Godinez-Samperio to receive the legal license he worked so hard
for, and to put it to use.
In the alternative, states should seek to pass legislation specifically
allowing issuance of legal licenses to undocumented immigrants to get
around § 1621.  Once undocumented immigrants are admissible, states
should make eligibility contingent on proving legal ability to work
rather than on immigration status.  This approach would allow those
with DACA approval or other prosecutorial discretion benefits to be
admitted and work as attorneys.234  In order to maintain this as an
234. See Qu, supra note 94, at 974–75 (“Once a noncitizen is granted deferred action status
and a work permit, he may legally remain in the United States and obtain employment.  In order
for an undocumented lawyer to work in the profession in which he has chosen and trained, he
must become a member of the bar in the state where he wishes to practice.  By not admitting
Godinez-Samperio . . . , the courts would prohibit [him] and other applicants who have received
employment authorization from practicing law, even though federal law has legally permitted
them to work in any capacity.  A denial of the graduates’ bar applications due to their current
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appropriate and equitable solution state bars could keep the license
active only so long as the undocumented attorney can continue to
demonstrate her legal ability to practice as an attorney.
V. CONCLUSION
Undocumented immigrant children are provided with a U.S. educa-
tion under Plyler and then told that they must self-deport at age eigh-
teen or be considered active violators of federal law.  This system is
contradictory and particularly frustrating for individuals like Jose
Godinez-Samperio, who has work authorization but is barred based
on status, and Sergio Garcia, who has been admitted to the bar but
has no work authorization despite years of waiting for a green card.
Rather than being rewarded for perseverance and academic excel-
lence, they are told they may never be able to put their hard-earned
skills and professional abilities to use.  Such individuals should be able
to find gainful employment in their field of expertise.  While full-scale
immigration reform may take years, feasible solutions for undocu-
mented law school graduates seeking admission to the bar may al-
ready exist.
Rather than hinging admission on immigration status, states should
instead consider whether an individual can prove her ability to be em-
ployed legally.  Ideally undocumented applicants should be provided a
specialized visa to provide them with legal status and work authoriza-
tion.  Undocumented immigrants who have already graduated from
law school deserve the chance to put their education and skills to use.
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